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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
F R E D H. BUHLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
V E R L S T O N E , Utah County
Commissioner, MACK H O L L E Y ,
Utah County Sheriff, and
U T A H COUNTY,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
13715

B R I E F OF P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an action arising from an alleged violation
of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1 which amended
Title 3 of the Revised Ordinances of Utah County 1956
relating to health and sanitation by adding Chapter 13
entitled "Inspection and Cleaning of Real Property."
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
This matter was tried without a jury on September
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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10, 1973. On April 29, 1974, a judgment was entered
upholding the provisions of Ordinance 1970-1 as constitutional. The court held that the ordinance was neither vague nor was it uncertain. The court further held
that the plaintiff had violated the ordinance by accumulating vehicles as well as other material upon his property and that he had been given proper notice to clean
up his property.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the court's ruling that
Utah County Ordinance 1970-1 is constitutional. Plaintiff contends the ordinance is unconstitutional because
of its vagueness and because the ordinance provides for
no hearing prior to depriving one of property which
is a denial of due process.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fred L. Buhler, the plaintiff, is a farmer and
steel worker residing in Highland, Utah. (Tr. 9) H e
owns approximately 40 acres and leases an additional
160 acres of farm land. (Tr. 44) Upon this farm he
stores personal property consisting of automobiles, some
of which are antiques (Tr. 12) and others of a vintage
nature. (Tr. 12) H e has purchased, traded and acquired
approximately 261 vehicles. (Tr. 9, 11) Mr. Buhler
testified that in his opinion the automobiles are worth
$51,815.00. (Tr. 11) Boyd Stice, an automobile dealer
in Utah County since 1936, (Tr. 49) valued eleven of
the vehicles at $3,250.00 (Tr. 51) H e stated, under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cross examination, that the balance of the vehicles (251)
would each be worth a minimum of $100. (Tr. 58) In
Mr. Stice's opinion, therefore, the 261 vehicles have a
total value approximating $28,000.00.
These automobiles are presently stored on plaintiff's farm. (Tr. 9) The Utah County Commission
has attempted to impound and remove them without
compensating the plaintiff because he failed to conform
to Utah County Ordinance 1970-1. The Commission
contends these stored automobiles violate Section 3-13-3
of the ordinance inasmuch as they are "unsightly." However a petition signed by 86 neighbors of the plaintiff
did not find the stored automobiles "unsightly." (Exh.
6)
A formal letter of the Commission on March 6,
1973, (Exh. 2) informed the plaintiff the problem
had to be corrected within 30 days. The plaintiff, after
meeting with the Commission on April 26, 1973, received another letter from the Commission dated May
8,1973, (Exh. 3) confirming an agreement to give plaintiff until June 25, 1973, to comply. At no time in this
controversy was plaintiff granted a meaningful hearing.
On July 6, 1973, (Exh. 4) plaintiff was informed
that he must remove all personal items from the cars
by July 11, 1973, as the county "was making preparations to clean up the property." However plaintiff
managed to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order on
July 13,1973, which prevented the county from hauling
the cars away. Later on July 20,1973, plaintiff obtained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a preliminary injunction which enjoined Utah County
from enforcing Title 3 of the Revised Ordinance until
the constitutionality of the ordinance had been determined. On November 27, 1973, the court entered a
memorandum ruling upholding the ordinance. Later
the District Court dissolved the injunction, dismissed
plaintiff's complaint and upheld the constitutionality
of the ordinance. The plaintiff appeals from this ruling.
The Utah County Commission contends the automobiles of the plaintiff should be removed pursuant to
Ordinance 1970-1. The Commission asserts this ordinance is constitutional and was properly enacted under
the general police power vested in Utah County. Plaintiff, on the contrary, claims the ordinance is unconstitutional because if his cars are impounded and removed
pursuant to the ordinance then he will be deprived of
property, valued at $28,000.00, without due process of
law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONSTITUTIONAL R E S T R A I N T S
I M P O S E D B Y T H E F E D E R A L CONS T I T U T I O N CAN'T B E CIRCUMV E N T E D BY U T A H COUNTY IN ITS
E X E R C I S E OF POLICE P O W E R
I t is elementary that county ordinances, such as
the Utah County Ordinance in dispute, derive their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
authority from the state government and must not be
repugnant to either the federal or state constitutions.
See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105
(1967)
Plaintiff maintains that Utah County Ordinance
1970-1 violates the Federal Constitutional requirements
of due process of law. The ordinance is undoubtedly an
exercise by Utah County of its police power and plaintiff is fully aware of the difficulty of formulating any
constitutional limitations on such an exercise of police
power. These difficulties, as well as the limitations
on the exercise of the police power, are noted in 16
Am.Jur.2di at 571,
The police power is commonly described
as the least limitable of governmental powers.
It is not, despite certain language to be found
in some decisions, an unlimited power, but its
limitations have never been drawn with exactness, and its boundary line cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, (emphasis added)
Despite the difficulty of prescribing limitations
to the police power, nevertheless a constitutional right
can not be abridged by legislation under the guise of a
police regulation. See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,
294 U.S. 550 (1935). The same idea is expressed in
56 Am.Jur. 2d at 474,
The police power of a municipality, broad
as it may be, cannot justify the passage of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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law or ordinance which runs counter to any of
the limitations of the Federal Constitution.
Utah County labels this ordmance a health measure.
However, the constitutional validity of any ordinance
is determined by its practical operation and effect and
not by its title. If under the terms of this county ordinance an individual can be deprived of property without
any hearing or if some provision is so vague that one
must necessarily guess at its meaning then it matters
not what the county calls it because the ordinance is
unconstitutional.
Plaintiff reminds the court that by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the Federal Constiution that state
action, such as this county ordinance, must give way
when in conflict with the Federal Constitution. The
power of a municipality although extremely broad can't
justify the passage of an ordinance which runs counter
to any limitations of the Federal Constitution. See
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Daly v.
Elton, 195 U.S. 242 (1904)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prevents any action by a state which would
deprive a person of his property without due process of
law. The purpose of the due process clause it to insure
the fair and orderly administration of the laws. This
protection extends to one's rights in the broadest sense
of the term. In spite of the fundamental importance of
the term, the phrase is difficult to define. 16 Am.Jur.
2d at 553 states,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
The extent to which constitutional limitations upon governmental power in general
operate to inhibit the exercise of the police
power is a most difficult matter, involving intricate questions and highly abstract ideas . . .
Consonant with their reluctance to formulate
any ironclad definition of the police power, or
announce any rigid boundaries to its exercise,
the courts have dealt with the issue of police
power as affected by constitutional requirements on a case by case basis . . . . (emphasis
added)
Plaintiff contends that the constitutionality of this
ordinance must be determined on the basis of the circumstances of this particular fact pattern and not on the
basis of any sweeping generalizations about the extent
of police power. The effect of enforcement of this ordinance is a denial of plaintiff's right to "due process of
law." The Federal Constitutional provision prohibiting
any denial of "due process of law" takes precedence
over any Utah County Ordinance.
POINT II
U T A H C O U N T Y O R D I N A N C E 1970-1
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
I T F A I L S TO P R O V I D E F O R A
MEANINGFUL HEARING
PRIOR
TO D E P R I V I N G O N E O F H I S P R O P ERTY
I t is not necessary for plaintiff to belabor the imDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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portance of the concept of "due process of law." The
Utah Supreme Court in Thompson v. Harris, 197 Utah
99, 152 P.2d 91 (1944) appropriately said of "due
process of law" that,
I t includes or perhaps is coterminous with
those 'principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental/ (emphasis added)
The United States Supreme Court in Brock v.
North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) said,
"Due process is the very essence of the
scheme of ordered justice."
An examination of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1
discloses absolutely no provision providing for any
hearing before an alleged violator is deprived of his
property. Under the county ordinance the determination
of whether an item is "unsightly," making it necessary
to remove the item from the premises, is left to the sole
discretion of Utah County who hires employees "to
determine whether the owner of such property are complying with the provisions of this Chapter." The ordinance thus gives carte blanche authority to the County
Commission to remove and destroy property that in
their unchecked opinion is "unsightly."
The defendants had ample opportunity to introduce
evidence that the ordinance in dispute contains any
provision providing for a meaningful hearing before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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one is deprived of his property. The defendants utterly
failed to produce such evidence because obviously there
exists no such provision in the ordinance.
The importance of such a meaningful hearing prior
to depriving one of his property has recently been reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) which involved
a challenge to the constitutionality of the pre-judgment
replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania law.
Both provisions permitted a private party without a
hearing or prior notice to the other party to obtain a
prejudgment writ of replevin through a summary process of ex parte application to a court clerk upon posting
a bond for double the value of the property seized. The
United States Supreme Court said,
The constitutional right to be heard is a
basic aspect of the duty of government to
follow a fair process of decision making when
it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.
The purpose of this requirement is not only
to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect
his use and possession of property from arbitrary encrouchment—to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken depriviations of
property.
If the right to notice and a hearing is to
serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it
must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an
individual's possessions can be returned to him
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in
the first place. Damages may even be awarded
to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no
later hearing and no damage awarded can undo
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was
subject to the right of procedural due process
has already occurred.
This is no new principle of constitutional
law. The right to a prior hearing has long been
recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court
has held that due process tolerates variances
in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the
nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for
that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. E . g., Bell v.
Bur son, 402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437; Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover
Tr. Co., supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-153; United
States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S.
457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Den^,210^8.373,385-386.
But it is now well settled that a tempDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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orary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337; Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535.
Plaintiff submits that there was uncontroverted
testimony at trial that the value of the automobiles
stored on plaintiff's property approximated $28,000.00.
A thorough examination of the provisions of this county
ordinance reveals that it contains no provision whatsoever granting any type of meaningful hearing prior to
depriving a person of his property. This plaintiff contends under the authority of Fuentes and Sniadach
is constitutionally intolerable.
POINT III
T H E ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE BECAUSE MEN
OF C O M P E T E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E
MUST NECESSARILY GUESS AT ITS
MEANING
The standard by which
in an ordinance are so vague
tutional was stated by the
State v. Packard, 122 Utah

to judge when the words
so as to render it unconstiUtah Supreme Court in
410 250 P.2d 581 (1952),

This court a number of times has applied the principle which is well stated in the
case of Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"* * * a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of
law. * * *"
See also Watson v. Board of Regents of University of
Colorado, 512 P.2d 1162 (1973); State v. Pigge, 79
Fla. 529 P.2d 703 (1958) ; Jacobsen v. Board of Criropractic Examiners, 337 P.2d 233 (1959).
The standard of voidness for uncertainity was stated
at 56 Am.Jur. 2d at 394,
I t is a well-recognized principle of law
that an ordinance must be definite and certain.
Certainly is necessary in order for an ordinance
to meet the test of reasonableness. There is
no hard-and-fast rule determining whether any
ordinance is void for indefiniteness, and the
rule of reason must be applied to every case
as it arises. An ordinance, such as one of a
regulatory or prohibitory nature must be clear,
definite, and certain, so that an average man
should be able with due care, after reading it,
to understand and ascertain whether he will
incur a penalty for particular acts or courses
of conduct. If he cannot reach such a determination from examination of an ordinance, it
is void for uncertainty, (emphasis added)
The case of Jones v. Logan City Corporation, 19
Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967) involved an action
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attempting to restrain Logan City from destroying
plaintiff's home. The City Board of Condemnation after
a hearing and inspection of the building made a finding
that it constituted a menace to public safety and should
therefore be demolished. The Utah Supreme Court said
an ordinance must provide standards,
While the statute above mentioned grants
to cities the power to declare what shall be a
nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in
fact define what a nuisance is. Ordinance No.
120 above referred to, which grants to the
Board of Condemnation the right to determine
whether any building constitutes a menace to
public health or public safety does not provide
standards on which the Board can base its
finding as to what is or what is not a menace
to public health or public safety. I t would
appear that the ordinance imposes upon the
Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial functions without standards or guidelines to govern
the Board in its determination, (emphasis
added)
Section 3-13-4 of the Utah County ordinance states
that it is unlawful for anyone to allow certain enumerated items such as abandoned vehicles to be left upon
ones property "whenever said items shall be unsightly
and in public views." Section 3-13-2 of the ordinance
requires that one remove any "unsightly deleterious
objects or structures upon notice from Utah County."
These are the words that plaintiff maintains are vague.
Although Logan City Corporation, supra dealt with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an alleged nuisance and the county ordinance in controversy deals ostensibly with health and sanitation yet
ascertainable standards in both are constitutionally indispensible. Plaintiff contends there exists not even
the remotest definite standard that Utah County could
possibly apply in order to determine whether the automobiles left on Mr. Buhler's property are "unsightly."
As a direct consequence of the vagueness of this ordinance it is impossible for Utah County to formulate
any consistent standard in order to determine what is
"unsightly." This renders enforcement entirely capricious and arbitrary.
Not only is the word "unsightly" unclear but the
general purpose of the ordinance is subject to serious
ambiguity. For example Section 10 of the ordinance
provides for an examination and inspection by the Board
of Health. One would suppose from this that the ordinance could be categorized as a health ordinance, however, defendants in their trial brief persisted in treating
the ordinance as one of nuisance abatement.
Plaintiff argues that the word "unsightly" is so
vague that persons are unable to ascertain what conduct
conforms to its requirements; that the word "unsightly"
is so vague and susceptible to multiple interpretations
and meanings that it is utterly impossible for the Utah
County officials charged with enforcing this ordinance
to formulate any definite standards; and that the impossibility of definite standards renders enforcement
wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. This
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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county ordinance is unconstitutional because its provisions are "so vague that men of ordinary intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differing
applications."
P O I N T IV
T H E A T T E M P T E D REMOVAL OF
P L A I N T I F F S AUTOMOBILES WAS
M O T I V A T E D BY AN A E S T H E T I C
S T A N D A R D W H I C H I S SO S U B J E C T I V E AS TO R E N D E R T H E O R D I NANCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiff submits that the emphasis placed upon
the removal of items from property that are 'unsightly"
makes the County ordinance one of enhancing the
"beauty" of the surroundings. Obviously an aesthetic
standard is completely impractical as the source of any
definite standard to be imposed as such by a governmental unit for the restriction or destruction of property
rights. This idea is noted in 16 Am.Jur. 2d at 569,
It has always been a well-settled rule, accepted even by courts which have partially
questioned its soundness in relation to modern
social conditions that the state cannot limit or
restrict the use which a person may make of
his property under the guise of the police
power, where the exercise of such power would
be warranted solely on aesthetic considerations.
Among other reasons for this principle, it has
been stated that only those police measures
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having for their object the safety and welfare
of the public justify restricting the use of
property by its owner, that any other standard is impossible to establish, and that aesthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and
indulgence, rather than of necessity, whereas
it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise
of the police power to take private property
without compensation, (emphasis added)
The court in Young stown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112
Ohio 654,148 N . E . 842 (1925) stated,
The world would be at continual seesaw
if aesthetic considerations were permitted to
govern the use of the police power. W e are
therefore remitted to the proposition that the
police power is based upon public necessity,
and that the public health, morals, or safety,
and not merely aesthetic interest, but must be
in danger in order to justify its use.
Obviously "unsightly" is a highly subjective and
relative term. The neighbors of the plaintiff failed to
find these cars stored on his property "unsightly." On
the contrary the county officials, charged with enforcing the ordinance, found them "unsightly." Plaintiff
contends the term "unsightly" imposes an aesthetic
standard which being extremely subjective, renders the
ordinance unconstitutional. The testimony at trial so
indicated.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff concludes, that Utah County Ordinance
1970-1 is unconstitutional because it fails to provide for
any meaningful hearing prior to being deprived of
property. The provision of the ordinance allowing removal of property when it is found to be "unsightly"
is unconstitutionally vague because men of
ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning. Therefore plaintiff asks
for a ruling that Utah County Ordinance
1970-1 violates the Federal Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
D O N R. P E T E R S E N
HOWARD, LEWIS
& PETERSEN
120 East Third North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for

Plaintiff-Appellant
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